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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an Appeal from a Decision on Appeal of Petition for Judicial Review of a Final 
Order by the Director of the Idaho State Police ("ISP"), in which the Director denied Petitioner-
Appellant Daniel S. Fuchs' ("Fuchs") motion for attorney fees pursuant to LC. 12-117. The 
Director denied Fuchs' fees, though by any reasonable measure, Fuchs prevailed by obtaining a 
dismissal of the forfeiture and/or revocation proceedings with no sanction. And, Alcohol 
Beverage Control Bureau of Idaho State Police ("ISP/ ABC") must be found to have pursued the 
action without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 1 The Director erroneously found that Fuchs was 
not a prevailing party avoiding awarding Fuchs attorney fees. 
The District Court affirmed the Director's Final Order on appeal. The District Court held 
that Fuchs had no substantial right denied and that the Director had not abused his discretion in 
finding that Fuchs was not the "prevailing party." The District Court did not reach the issue of 
whether ISP/ABC acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The District Court erred as a 
matter oflaw. 
First, if a prevailing party meets the requirements of I.C 12-117, the award of attorney 
fees is mandatory and is thus a substantial right. Further, the right to an impartial decision-maker 
is a fundamental right of due process. The District Court denied this right of due process, when 
it refused to review the Director's Final Order, holding that Fuchs had no substantial rights 
denied. Second, as a matter oflaw, Fuchs was a prevailing party, as he obtained the relief he 
sought in the administrative proceeding, a dismissal of the action. 
1ISP / ABC, a bureau within the Department ofldaho State Police, has been delegated by the Director, the "authority 
for the licensing of establishments which sell alcoholic beverages, as contained in Title 23, Chapters 9, 10, and 13, 
Idaho Code." IDAPA 11.05.01.011.02. The Director retains "supervisory authority for alcoholic beverage 
licensing." Id. 
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Finally, ISP/ABC acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in pursuing forfeiture 
and/or revocation. It did so without any clearly articulated standard, based upon unlawful 
procedure, and in violation of the policies set forth in the Idaho Constitution. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's Decision on Appeal, holding that Fuchs 
was the prevailing party and that ISP/ABC acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The 
case should be remanded for determination of the amount of fees to be awarded to Fuchs. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
On October 23, 2008, ABC filed its Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail 
Alcohol Beverage License.2 
On October 9, 2009, following extensive discovery, the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment. 
On December 24, 2009, the Hearing Officer issued his Preliminary Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment and Order on Complainant's Renewed Motion for Protective Order. The 
Hearing Officer granted summary judgment to Fuchs. 
The parties moved for reconsideration. On January 28, 2010, the Hearing Officer denied 
the parties' motions for reconsideration. 
On February 2, 2010, ABC timely filed a Petition for Review with the Director, Idaho 
State Police. 
On June 8, 2010, the Director of the Idaho State Police issued the Director's Final Order. 
The Director dismissed the administrative action, "each side to bear their own attorney fees and 
costs." (Director's Final Order at 19). 
2 The Agency Record was filed with the District Court on August 18, 2010. (R. at 2). All references to documents 
in the Agency Record shall refer to the name of the document and the date filed. As to exhibits attached to 
affidavits, exhibits identified with an "R" are attached to the affidavit of Brian Donesley in Support of Respondent 
Daniel S. Fuchs' Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 9, 2009. Exhibits identified as "R-DF" are attached 
to the Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs dated October 9, 2009. 
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On July 1, 2010, Fuchs timely filed his Notice of Appeal/Petition for Judicial Review in 
the District Court of the First Judicial District, Kootenai County (Rat 6). 
On February 10,2011, the District Court, the Honorable Lansing Haynes presiding, 
issued its Decision on Appeal, affirming the Director's Final Order. (R. at 119). 
On March 11, 2011, Fuchs filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. at 124). 
C. Statement of Facts3 
1. Statutory and Rulemaking Background 
In 1980, the Idaho Legislature amended the Idaho Code, requiring new issue liquor 
licensees to put licenses into "actual use" at issuance and to keep them in "use" for at least six 
(6) months. LC. 23-908 (4). 
In 1993, ISP/ABC promulgated Rule 10.03, providing how a new issue liquor licensee 
off the priority lists may satisfy the "actual use" requirements of LC. 23-908 (4). This rule states 
in relevant part: 
The requirement of Section 23-908(4), Idaho Code, that a new license be placed 
into actual use by the licensee and remain in use for at least six ( 6) consecutive 
months is satisfied if the licensee makes actual sales of liquor by the drink during 
at least eight (8) hours per day, no fewer than six (6) days per week. 
IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 
Prior administrators at Idaho State Police testified by affidavit that no specified number 
of "actual sales" had ever been required of new licensees. Major Thomas Thompson stated: 
During my tenure as major supervising the ISP Division of which the Alcohol 
Beverage Control Bureau was an administrative sub-entity, including part of the 
tenure of Lt. Clements as ABC Bureau Chief, the New License Rule was 
interpreted to require that new licensees secure a qualified premise and that liquor 
be made available for sale during the first six months after issuance of a priority 
3 The Statement of Undisputed Facts contained herein is a brief summary. For a complete recitation, Fuchs refers 
this Court to the Statement of Undisputed Facts set forth in Respondent's Brief on Review by Agency Head, pp. 6-
15 filed with the agency on April 16, 2010. 
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list There was no requirement that a new licensee make actual sales of alcohol. 
(Affidavit ofISP Major Thomas C. Thompson (ret) dated October 9, 2009, hereinafter 
"Thompson Affidavit") 
Captain Edgar Rankin stated: 
ISP did not require actual sales of alcohol in order to meet the actual use 
requirements of LC. 23-908 ( 4), because requiring sales as a condition of 
maintaining a license would violate the policy of the State of Idaho by 
encouraging and requiring as a condition of licensure, increased consumption of 
alcohol. 
(Affidavit of Captain Edgar Rankin (ret) dated October 9, 2009, hereinafter, "Rankin 
Affidavit," at ,r 3). 
Prior ABC administrator John Gould testified similarly: 
There was no requirement that a new licensee make actual sales during each of 
the eight (8) hours a day, no fewer than six (6) days a week during the first six (6) 
months after issuance of a new license. This was because ABC could not require 
a new licensee to produce customers or to sell liquor to customers who were not 
there. 
(Affidavit of John Gould dated October 9, 2009, hereinafter "Gould Affidavit," at 
,r 4) 
Relevant to this case is that previously, in 2003, ISP/ABC offered four new licenses off 
the priority lists to Fuchs in Nampa, Idaho. (Exhibit R-DF-1 to Affidavit of Daniel S. Fuchs 
dated October 9, 2009, hereinafter "Fuchs Affidavit"). Fuchs was then told by ISP/ABC that he 
was not required to make actual sales, but that he was required to have liquor available for sale 
during at least eight (8) hours a day, no fewer than six (6) days a week. (Affidavit of Denise 
Rogers dated October 9, 2009, hereinafter "Rogers Affidavit'' at ,r 4). Fuchs was issued those 
four new licenses. (Fuchs Affidavit; Exhibits R-DF-2, 3, 4, 5). Of import is that Fuchs actually 
made fewer sales at these premises than at his Aubrey's House of Ale business in Coeur d'Alene 
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at issue here. ("Aubrey's") (Exhibit R-4 to Affidavit of Brian Donesley dated October 9, 2009, 
hereinafter "Donesley Affidavit"). Although ISP/ ABC investigated how many sales Fuchs made 
at each of the four licensed premises, ISP/ABC did not issue an administrative notice of violation 
to Fuchs alleging that he had failed to make "actual sales," or pursue an administrative case 
pertaining to that issue. (Donesley Affidavit, Exhibit R-4; Fuchs Affidavit, Exhibit R-DF-6). 
On May 19, 2008, Fuchs applied for a state liquor license for the City of Coeur d'Alene. 
(Fuchs Affidavit; Exhibit R-DF-8). On June 6, 2008, ISP/ABC issued Fuchs an Idaho Retail 
Alcohol Beverage License. (Fuchs Affidavit; Exhibit R-DF-16). 
Fuchs leased space at 2065 West Riverstone Drive,# 207 in Coeur d'Alene and obtained 
all necessary licenses and permits required by state and local agencies. (Fuchs Affidavit; 
Exhibits R-DF-7, 10-12). Fuchs employed staff, obtained unemployment insurance and 
workers compensation insurance. (Fuchs Affidavit; Exhibits R-DF-13, 14, 15). Aubrey's 
House of Ale in Coeur d'Alene during all times relevant remained open each Monday through 
Saturday, from l 0:00 am to 6:00 pm. (Fuchs Affidavit at~ 13). 
On September 16, 2008, Lt. Clements, ISP/ABC Bureau Chief, conducted an 
unannounced inspection of Aubrey's. Lt. Clements met with Ruth Purvis, Fuchs' employee. He 
observed no customers. Purvis showed Lt. Clements the supply of liquor and beer available for 
sale to the public. 
Upon request by Lt. Clements, Fuchs produced copies of sales records for Aubrey's for 
the months June 2008 through September 2008. Aubrey's had generated sales for each month. 
Fuchs reported sales of $598. l l to the Idaho Tax Commission for the period from July l, 2008 to 
September 30, 2008. Fuchs Affidavit; Exhibits R-DF-17-18). 
On October 14, 2008, ISP/ ABC issued an administrative notice of violation, alleging the 
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license was not properly being used. (Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail Alcohol 
Beverage License dated October 23, 2008). 
2. Agency Proceedings 
a. Proceedings before the Hearing Officer. 
On October 23, 2008, ABC filed its Complaint for Forfeiture or Revocation of Retail 
Alcohol Beverage License. On October 9, 2009, following extensive discovery, the parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment. On December 24, 2009 after oral argument, the Hearing 
Officer issued his Preliminary Order granting summary judgment to Fuchs. 
The Hearing Officer ruled that IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 unambiguously required a new 
licensee to make actual sales of liquor by the drink "sometime" while in operation for eight (8) 
hours a day/no fewer than six (6) days a week: 
The rule promulgated by the Complainant to satisfy the "actual use" language of 
Idaho Code 23-908 (4) unequivocally states that the requirement of Idaho Code 
23-908 (4) that a new license be placed into actual use by a licensee and remain 
used for six consecutive months is satisfied if the licensee makes actual sale of 
liquor by the drink during at least eight hours per day and no fewer that six days 
per week. Contrary to the emphasis placed on other phrases and words within the 
regulation by the parties, it would appear that applying the plain, obvious and 
literal meaning to the word "during" would satisfy any inquiry into whether 
IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is ambiguous or unambiguous. 
The definition of "during, " inter alia, is "throughout the duration of" The 
definition of "duration" is "the time during which something exists or lasts." 
Thus, it would appear a licensee would be required to make actual sales of liquor 
by the drink sometime while it is in operation for eight hours a day/no fewer than 
six days a week. Applying this interpretation to the undisputed facts, the evidence 
shows that while sales of liquor by the glass by the Respondent at Aubrey's are 
spotty at best, sales have nevertheless taken place. (underline in original, italics 
added). 
Preliminary Order on Motions for Summary Judgment and Order on Complainant's 
Renewed Motion for Protective Order dated December 24, 2009 at 15-16 (hereinafter, 
"Preliminary Order"). 
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The Hearing Officer also held that ABC was barred under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, 
since "the Complainant is now taking inconsistent positions of its past practices regarding 
requirements of new liquor licensees." Preliminary Order at 18. 
Fuchs also had moved for summary judgment on whether ABC's new policy was 
improper rulemaking and an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of police power. The Hearing 
Officer held that, because his ruling on the interpretation of the rule was dispositive, the 
remaining issues "were moot." Preliminary Order at 19. n.6. 
The Hearing Officer did not award attorney fees to Fuchs, as, based upon the law at the 
time, he had no authority to do so: 
Both parties have sought attorney fees in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117 and other applicable statutes and rules. Under Idaho Code § 12-117 only the 
court and not an administrative officer or agency can award attorney fees to a 
prevailing party. See, Rammell v. Idaho State Department of Agriculture, 147 
Idaho 415 (2009). As such, no attorney fees are awarded. 
Preliminary Order at 19.4 
b. ABC's Petition for Review by Agency Head. 
ISP/ABC appealed the Hearing Officer's Decision to the Director of the Idaho State 
Police. On June 8, 2010, the Director issued his Final Order, declaring that Rule 10.03 was 
ambiguous, as Fuchs had argued from the beginning5, but announcing his own new 
4 In Rammell, this Court overruled previous decisions and held, as the Hearing Officer observed, that only Courts 
were authorized to award attorney fees under LC. 12-117 On March 3, 2010, the Idaho Legislature amended LC. 
12-117 expressly to provide that administrative officers and agencies could award attorney fees. House Bill 421, 
SIXTIETH LEGISLATURE, SECOND REGULAR SESSION, 2010. Following this legislative action, this Court has held that 
parties may only seek attorney fees in "administrative proceedings" but not in "administrative judicial proceedings." 
Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho 388, 392 (2010). 
5From the beginning, Fuchs has maintained that Rule 10.03 was unambiguous in how it had been interpreted without 
exception as requiring no particular number of sales over any period of time to satisfy the "actual sales" 
requirements. See, Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review, pp. 18-19 (Rat 32-33). 
Alternatively, Fuchs argued from the beginning that, if ambiguity were found, the rule became unenforceable. In 
either case, Fuchs would prevail. Rather, the Director found ambiguity but attempted to cure it, ignoring that such 
finding fully supported Fuchs' challenge to the administrative revocation throughout the proceedings. 
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interpretation: 
The Hearing Officer's Interpretation of Rule 10.03 is clearly incorrect. However, 
this does not automatically dictate that ABC's interpretation is correct. 
Examining the language of the rule, reasonable minds can reach different 
conclusions regarding its precise meaning. In other words, it is ambiguous. The 
rule can reasonably be read one (1) of three (3) ways. A licensee must: 
a. sell at least one (1) glass ofliquor eve:ry hour for at least eight (8) hours, 
six ( 6) days or more a week. (This would require at least forty-eight ( 48) 
sales a week and is how ABC is apparently interpreting the rule); or 
b. sell at least one ( 1) glass of liquor sometime during eve:ry day that the 
establishment is open. The establishment must be open for at least eight (8) 
hours per day, six (6) days or more a week. (This would require at least (6) 
sales a week); or 
c. sell at least one ( 1) glass of liquor sometime during a period of time 
during which the establishment is open at least eight hours a day, at least six 
(6) days a week (this would require only (1) sale a week). 
The proper interpretation of IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 is that a new licensee must 
sell at least one ( 1) glass of liquor sometime during eve:ry day that the 
establishment is open. The establishment must be open for at least eight (8) hours 
per day, six (6) days a week. 
Director's Final Order at 10-11. 
Additionally, the Director overruled the Hearing Officer by holding that ISP/ABC was 
not barred under quasi-estoppel from taking inconsistent positions, stating incongruously that 
"there is no question that Fuchs violated Rule 10.03." Director's Final Order at 12. 
And, the Director ruled that ABC did not engage in improper rulemaking, because 
"ABC's notifications to Fuchs (including the interpretation adopted by the Director and stated in 
this Final Decision) qualify as written statements from the agency to the licensee pertaining to 
how the agency is interpreting Rule 10.03." Director's Final Order at 15. 
The Director held that ISP/ABC's actions were not arbitrary and unreasonable, because 
Rule 10.03 requires "actual sales," and "the only thing ambiguous about the rule was whether 
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those actual sales have to be hourly, daily or weekly." Id. at 16. 
Despite such pronouncements, the Director did not order revocation or forfeiture of 
Fuchs' license, though, ostensibly, he had ruled against Fuchs on each issue: 
The record shows that Fuchs violated IDAP A 11.05.01.010.03 by failing to make 
the necessary sales on numerous days and even several entire weeks during the 
relevant six ( 6) month period. However, given the confusion over the proper 
interpretation of the rule and its misapplication by both parties and the Hearing 
Officer, Fuchs will not be sanctioned for this violation, and the clarification of 
the proper interpretation of IDAP A 11.05.01.010.03 set forth in this Final Order 
shall have prospective effect only. 
Id. at 18 ( emphasis added). 
The Director declined to award attorney fees to either party, stating that neither party had 
prevailed and that Fuchs had not acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law: 
Under Idaho Code 12-117, an administrative agency shall award attorney fees to 
the prevailing party, but only when the losing party "acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." In this case, the Director has reversed the Hearing 
Officer's Preliminary Order and found that Fuchs violated the applicable rule. 
Therefore, Fuchs is not the prevailing party and is not eligible for attorney fees 
under Section 12-117. However, neither is ABC. While the Director has 
concluded that Fuchs violated IDAP A 11.05.01.010.03, it cannot be said that he 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The rule at issue in this case is ambiguous. Prior ISP administrators, the Hearing 
Officer, and both parties misinterpreted what the rule requires. Although Fuchs 
was properly put on advanced notice that actual sales were necessary, there was 
still considerable confusion over the exact details of those sales. 
Id. at 17 ( emphasis added). 
On July 1, 2010, Fuchs filed a Notice of Appeal/Petition for Judicial Review with the 
District Court seeking costs and attorney fees (R. at 1-7). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether Appellant Fuchs' "substantial rights," contemplated by LC. 67-5279 (4), 
were prejudiced. The District Court erred in applying an overbroad, discretionary standard to the 
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Director on appeal to him, in finding the Director's discretion excused the denial of Appellant 
Fuchs' "substantial rights" to costs and attorney's fees, due process oflaw, and freedom from the 
unreasonable exercise of police power. 
B. Whether Appellant Fuchs was a "prevailing party," entitling him to seek costs and 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 12-117. 
C. Whether Respondent ISP actions were without a reasonable basis in fact or law, 
because Respondent ISP's attempt to revoke Appellant Fuchs's license, without a clear standard 
as to how many "actual sales" were required, was: 
• an unreasonable exercise of police power; 
• arbitrary, capricious, and not based upon adequate determining principles; 
• based upon unlawful procedure, and; 
• in violation of the Idaho Constitution. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
III 
ARG"l'MENT 
An agency's action may be set aside, if the agency's findings, conclusions or decisions: 
(a) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) 
are made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) are not supported by substantial evidence on the record 
as a whole; or, (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. 67-5279 (3). In 
addition, Idaho courts will affirm agency action, unless a substantial right of the appellant has 
been prejudiced. LC. 67-5279(4). 
This Court freely and de novo reviews a district court's decision regarding attorney fees 
under LC. 12-117. Gardiner v. Boundary County Bd. of Com 'rs, 148 Idaho 764, 769 (2010). 
Reardon and Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc., v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118 (2004). 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT FUCHS HAD 
NO "SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS" TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
Fuchs had "substantial rights" denied, when the Director held that Fuchs was not a 
"prevailing party" and declined to award costs and attorney fees to him. ISP/ABC had acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This Court has held that, under LC. 12-117, an award 
of attorney fees is mandatory to a prevailing party and when the non-moving party acted without 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. Secondly, Fuchs' "substantial rights" prejudiced include the 
fundamental due process right to an impartial decision-maker in reviewing his request for fees 
and costs. The Director, the head of the agency, was not impartial. The District Court 
compounded this due process deprivation, when it deferred to the "substantial rights" have been 
prejudiced. This Court should reverse the District Court's Decision and Order on Appeal 
affirming the Director's Final Order. 
This Court has held that a party must demonstrate that two requirements are met, before 
an agency decision will be overturned. Dry Creek Partners, LLC v. Ada County Com 'rs, ex rel. 
State, 148 Idaho 11, 16 (2009). Initially, the party must show that the agency's decision violates 
LC. 67-5279 (3). Id. This statute provides that the court shall affirm an agency decision, unless 
the court finds that the agency's finding, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
As the District Court noted, Fuchs "exhaustively" argued for costs and fees, submitting 
evidence in support of his argument that ISP/ABC: 
• violated constitutional and statutory provisions; 
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• acted in excess of its statutory authority; 
• based its decision upon unlawful procedure; 
• acted in a manner not based upon substantial evidence; 
• and/or was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. (R. at 124). 
Fuchs reasserts each and every such basis, upon which ISP/ABC violated I.C. 67-5279 (3).6 
The District Court avoided ruling on the first step in the analysis, that ISP violated I.C. 
67-5279 (3). Instead, the District Court held that the second step in the analysis was not 
satisfied, holding that Fuchs had no "substantial rights" prejudiced, as required by I.C. § 67-5279 
(4).7 The District Court held: 
Fuchs exhaustively analyzes and argues I.C. 67-5279 (3), the five findings upon 
which a reviewing court can set aside an agency action. This Court determines 
that it need not make findings or conclusions on the five criteria of LC. 67-5279 
(3); this determination is based upon I.C. 67-5279 (4), which provides that an 
agency action shall be affirmed unless the substantial rights of the appellant have 
been prejudiced. See Lane Ranch Partnership v City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 
175 P. 2d 776 (2007). Fuchs has failed to persuade this Court that costs and 
attorney fees are a substantial right contemplated by the statute. Fuchs, was not, 
in fact, sanctioned by the Director in his Final Order, and no substantial right of 
his has been denied. 
Decision on Appeal at 3, Rat 124.8 
6ISP/ABC's violation of each of these provisions is also a basis upon which Fuchs asserts that ABC has acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. If this Court determines that ISP/ ABC acted arbitrarily and capriciously or 
contrary to law, Fuchs necessarily shall have satisfied the requirements of J.C. 67-5279 (3). See, Ater v. Idaho 
Bureau of Occupational Licensing, 144 Idaho 281 (2007) (this Court affirmed District Court's decision that board 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in underlying case and awarded attorney fees under LC. 12-117); County Residents 
Against Pollution From Septic Sludge (CRAPPS) v Bonner County, 138 Idaho 585 (2007) (county violated 
ordinance and, thus, acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law); Reardon and Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. 
v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115 (2004) (county violated state constitution and, thus, acted without reasonable basis 
in fact or law). 
7 LC. 67-5279 (4) requires that a court shall affirm an agency decision, unless the agency prejudiced the substantial 
rights of the appellant: "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency action 
shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." Id. 
8 ISP/ABC did not argue that Fuchs' "substantial rights" had not been prejudiced. The District Court raised the 
issue, sua sponte, in its Decision on Appeal. 
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The District Court erred as a matter oflaw. Contrary to the District Court's ruling, it is 
because Fuchs was not "sanctioned" that Fuchs was the prevailing party whose' "substantial 
rights" were violated.9 The Director did not "sanction" Fuchs and dismissed the administrative 
action with prejudice. Accordingly, Fuchs obtained the relief he sought and was a "prevailing 
party" within the meaning ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (e) (l),10 leaving him with no 
recourse for costs and fees in asserting his rights, under the District Court's result. Furthermore, 
Fuchs had a "substantial right" to due process violated, when the Director, responsible for the 
costs and fees award, fashioned an Order to avoid that mandatory costs and fees award. 
LC. 12-117 is a mandatory statute. Fuchs had a right to an award of costs and fees, if he 
satisfied its conditions. The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that a mandatory costs and fees 
statute creates a "right" or "entitlement." In Myers v. Vermaas, 114 Idaho 85 (Ct. App. 1988), 
the Court of Appeals held that a mandatory attorney fees statute could not be applied 
retroactively. Unlike a discretionary statute, it creates a right: 
When this classification scheme is applied to statutes authorizing discretionary 
awards of attorney fees, such statutes are generally held to be remedial or 
procedural. Consequently, they are given retroactive effect. ... However, we 
think a different analysis is required for LC.§ 12-120. Unlike LC. 12-121 and 61-
617A, LC. 12-120 provides for a mandatory, not discretionary award of attorney 
fees to the prevailing party in commercial litigation. The automatic nature of an 
award under LC. 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the underlying 
commercial agreement between the parties. It establishes an entitlement. In this 
respect, an award under the statute is closely akin to other "contractual or 
vested" rights contained in the agreement itself. 
Myers, 114 Idaho at 87 (emphasis in original). 
This Court has adopted the Myers analysis in Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228 (1989), 
9 The proposed "sanction" here was not a license suspension or a fine. It was a license revocation, a prohibition of 
Fuchs selling retail alcohol beverages and disqualification from obtaining future liquor licenses. See, LC. 23-910(3). 
10 See, infra atpp. 17-20. 
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quoting: "we think that the 1986 amendment to LC. 12-120, which enlarged the scope of 
entitlement to mandatory attorney fee awards, is more accurately classified as substantive than as 
merely remedial or procedural." Griggs, 116 Idaho at 235 (quoting Myers, 114 Idaho at 87) 
(emphasis added). As Fuchs met the requirements of LC. 12-117, he has a "substantial right" to 
costs and attorney fees. ISP/ABC does not challenge the principle that a party who meets the 
requirements of LC. 12-117 has a "substantial right" to attorney fees. The District Court's ruling 
to the contrary was issued sua sponte. The District Court erred as a matter of law. 
Fuchs' rights to due process were violated, because the Director was not an impartial 
decision-maker. The District Court's ruling that Fuchs had no substantial rights denied, deprived 
Fuchs of the right ofreview required by the APA under State ex rel. Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 
117 Idaho 1 (1989). This Court has held that "due process rights are substantial rights." Eddins 
v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36 (2010) "Due process of law guarantees no particular form 
of procedure; it protects substantial rights." Id. (quoting Mitchell v. WT. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 
600, 610 (1974)). This Court also has held that parties have a substantial right to a "reasonably 
fair decision-making process." Hawkins v. Bonneville County Board of Commissioners, 151 
Idaho 228,232 (2011). In short, there is an "overarching due process principle that everyone 
with a statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to meaningful notice and a fair 
hearing before an impartial decision-maker." Id. 
In this case, the Director released Fuchs' license from the administrative sanction. Fuchs 
prevailed. Yet, since any award of costs and fees would have been paid from ISP funds, the 
Director fashioned a Final Order based upon an opinion, not the evidence, and he ruled that 
Fuchs did not prevail. 
A purpose of judicial review, mandated by LC. 67-5270 and 67-5279, is to guard against 
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bias by an administrative officer. In State ex rel. Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 11 7 Idaho I 
( 1989), this Court held that judicial review cures potential bias of an administrative officer. In 
Pierandozzi, a liquor licensee challenged the constitutionality of the procedure for choosing and 
compensating contested case hearing examiners by the Department of Law Enforcement 
(predecessor to ISP). Hearing Officers were chosen from departmental list and compensated by 
the Department on a case-by-case basis. The licensee argued that the system was analogous to 
the former justice of the peace system condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510 (1927), in which the Court held that due process oflaw was denied to one tried 
before a judicial officer whose sole source of income was from fines collected from the accused. 
Id. at 4. This Court found in Pierandozzi that the AP A's requirement of judicial review provided 
for a check on potential bias. "The potential for bias is cured by the fact that the parties have the 
right to judicial appeal of any administrative decision manifesting an abuse of discretion, 
arbitrary and capricious disposition, or findings which are clearly erroneous in light of the 
evidence presented at the hearing. Id. at 4. See also, Staff of the Idaho Real Estate Commission 
v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 636 (200 I) ("[a]lthough a potential conflict of interest is created by 
the statutory scheme enacted by the legislature," whereby the Real Estate Commission could 
award itself attorney fees against an agent upon a finding of guilt, "judicial review of the actions 
of the Idaho Real Estate Commission cures any such potential conflict"). 
Here, the District Court's review of the Director's Final Order could have provided Fuchs 
with protection from the Director's "arbitrary and capricious disposition" of this matter. Instead, 
the District Court held that "Fuchs was not sanctioned by the Director in his Final Order, and no 
substantial right of his has been denied." Decision on Appeal at 3, R. at 124. By this 
declaration, the District Court deprived Fuchs of the right ofreview. No oversight or "cure" of 
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the "potential bias" was in place. The Director's finding that Fuchs was not the prevailing party 
was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion, and, given that Fuchs was completely 
successful in his defense of the action, "clearly erroneous." Fuchs, consistent with due process, 
should have been entitled to bring his claim of attorney fees to an unbiased, impartial and 
disinterested tribunal. Owsley v .Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 135-136 (2005) 
('" [ t ]he due process clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal.' The 
constitutional requirement that an adjudicator be free from bias applies equally to the courts and 
to state administrative agencies"). 
In Johnson v. Bonner County School District No. 82, 126 Idaho 490 (1994), this Court 
explained that, "[i]t is well established that 'actual bias of a decisionmaker is constitutionally 
unacceptable."' Id. at 493 (quoting Bowler v. Board of Trustees, l 01 Idaho 537, 543 (1980). 
Not only is a biased decisionmaker constitutionally unacceptable but "our system 
of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." In 
pursuit of this end, various situations have been identified in which experience 
teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or 
decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these cases 
are those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and 
in which [the adjudicator] has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from 
the party before [the adjudicator]. 
Id. (quoting Withrow v, Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (emphasis added). 
While the ISP Director did not directly have a personal pecuniary interest, costs and fees 
awarded would necessarily have been paid from the ISP budget. It is "constitutionally 
unacceptable" for such a decision be made by someone who could not be expected to act 
impartially. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's conviction, where the mayor before whom petitioner 
was compelled to stand trial for traffic offenses was responsible for village finances, and the 
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mayor's court, through fines, forfeitures, costs and fees, provided a substantial portion of the 
village funds. The United States Supreme Court held that the petitioner had been denied trial 
before a disinterested and impartial judicial officer, as guaranteed by the due process clause: 
Plainly that 'possible temptation' may also exist when the mayor's executive 
responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high 
level of contribution from the mayor's court. This, too, is a 'situation in which an 
official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one 
partisan and the other judicial, (and) necessarily involves a lack of due process of 
law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him.' 
Ward, 409 U.S. at 60 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)). 
The District Court deferred to the Director on the issue of attorney fees, making this case 
indistinguishable from Ward. The District Court's deference eliminated the oversight which was 
what this Court in Pierandozzi said made the administrative process pass constitutional muster. 
This Court should remand this matter to the Director to determine the amount of the award of 
costs and fees. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 
AFFIRMED THE DIRECTOR'S CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FINDING 
THAT FUCHS WAS NOT THE "PREVAILING PARTY." THE 
DIRECTOR SUBSTITUTED HIS OPINION, RATHER THAN BASING 
HIS OPINION ON THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. THE RECORD 
SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT FUCHS WAS THE "PREVAILING 
PARTY." ANY RULING TO THE CONTRARY WAS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
An award of attorney fees and costs under LC. 12-117 has been distilled into a two-part 
test. Fees must be awarded, if: (1) the Court finds in favor of the person; and (2) the agency 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Reardon and Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc v. 
City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118 (2004). Fuchs met the first part of this two-part test. He was 
the "prevailing party." Fuchs obtained the relief he sought in the administrative action in its 
entirety. The administrative action was dismissed with prejudice, and Fuchs' license not 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page 17 of30 
revoked. Accordingly, the Director erred as a matter of law, when he determined that Fuchs was 
not the "prevailing party." The Director was required to apply the law to the facts of the case. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's Decision on Appeal and remand this matter to the 
Director for a determination of the amount of costs and attorney fees to be awarded. 
The District Court held that the Director, perceiving the issue as discretionary, correctly 
denied attorney fees to both parties. According to the Director, neither party prevailed: 
The Director below, as previously stated, denied attorney fees to both parties on 
the basis that neither party was prevailing. This was a reasonable view of the 
proceedings by the Director given that Fuchs was found to have violated the 
requirements of a new licensee, but no sanctions were levied against Fuchs. This 
was also a discretionary call by the Director, and there is nothing in the record to 
support an argument that the Director abused his discretion. The record supports 
the conclusion that the Director viewed this decision as discretionary, acted within 
the perimeters of that discretion and acted in a reasonable manner. 
Decision on Appeal at 4, R. at 125. 
The District Court erred as a matter of law for two reasons. First, by finding that Fuchs 
was not the "prevailing party," the Director disregarded the evidence and substituted his own 
opinion, declaring that neither party prevailed. Director's Final Order at 17. In Ater v. Idaho 
Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 281 (2007), this Court affirmed the district court's 
holding, inter alia, the Board "did not use its specialized knowledge and experience to evaluate 
the evidence but, instead, substituted that knowledge for the evidence presented ... The district 
court also found that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it disregarded the 
evidence as presented... Id. at 284. Likewise, here, the Director disregarded the evidence and 
found that Fuchs "violated the applicable rule." Director's Final Order at 17. The evidence 
demonstrated that Fuchs did not violate Rule 10.03, as it had been interpreted for fifteen years by 
previous administrators. (Thompson, Rankin and Gould Affidavits). Fuchs did not violate Rule 
10.03 as it had been interpreted by Lt. Clements in 2005, when Fuchs operated four bars in 
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Nampa. Preliminary Order at 12, 16. (Donesley Affidavit, Exhibit R-4, Fuchs Affidavit; 
Exhibit R-DF-6). It is undisputed that Fuchs made actual sales as the Hearing Officer so found. 
Preliminary Order at 12. (Fuchs Affidavit Exhibit R-DF-17-18). The Director announced a 
new, first impression interpretation of the rule in his Final Order. He then ruled, retroactively, 
that Fuchs had violated it. Director's Final Order at 12. As stated in Ater, the Director violated 
Fuchs' rights of due process, by substituting his unsupported opinion, and his new rule, for the 
evidence on the record. 
Second, the Director's finding that Fuchs was not the "prevailing party" was an abuse of 
discretion and clearly erroneous. Fuchs obtained the relief he sought in the matter below in its 
entirety. In Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,411 (1983), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
explained the three factors to be considered when determining which party, if any, prevailed: ( 1) 
the final judgment or the result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were 
multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties 
prevailed on each of the claims or issues. In Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, 
Inc, 134 Idaho 259 (Ct. App. 2000), abrogated on other grounds, the Court of Appeals explained 
that the defendant was the prevailing party, as "the result obtained in this case was a dismissal of 
Daisy's action with prejudice, the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved by 
Paintball as a defendant." Id. at 262. 
Here, as in Daisy Manufacturing, Fuchs received the "most favorable outcome that could 
possibly be achieved," dismissal. While the Director discussed issues before him, stating that 
quasi-estoppel did not apply, that there was no improper rulemaking, and that his department had 
not engaged in an unreasonable exercise of police power, his rulings on these issues are dicta. 
"There is a pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in an opinion and what is 
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decided by it." Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 88 (l 925) (quoting Stael ex rel. Bixby v. City of 
St. Louis, 145 S.W. 801 (1912) (emphasis in original)). 
Moreover, the Director ruled against Fuchs on these issues to avoid paying attorney fees 
under I.C. 12-117. Any award of attorney fees would have been paid out ofISP funds. The 
Director fashioned a Final Order that decided, unreasonably, in light of the record, that Fuchs 
had not prevailed. As discussed, supra, one of the purposes of judicial review mandated by LC. 
67-5270 and 67-5279 is to guard against bias by an administrative officer. See, State ex rel. 
Richardson v. Pierandozzi, 117 Idaho 1 (1989 ). 
The District erred when it held that the Director was entitled to deference in his finding 
that Fuchs was not the "prevailing party." This Court should remand this matter to the District 
Court. 
D. ISP/ABC ACTED "WITHOUT A REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR 
LAW": THE ACTION WAS ARBITRARY ANDCAPRICIOUS,NOT 
BASED UPON AN ARTICULATED STANDARD; THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION WAS BASED UPON "RULES" NOT 
PROMULGATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS OF 
LAW; AND, THE "RULE" UPON WHICH THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION WAS BASED VIOLATED ARTICLE III,§ 24 OF THE 
IDAHO CONSTITUTION AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE ACTION IS 
PER SE WITHOUT A REASONABLE BASIS IN FACT OR LAW. 
The District Court declined to address whether ISP/ ABC acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law in affirming the Director's finding that Fuchs was not the "prevailing party." 
Decision on Appeal at 4; R. at 125). However, the Director's Final Order constituted sufficient 
findings from which the District Court should have ruled that ISP/ABC acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. With this case, ISP chose to ignore fifteen years of agency 
interpretation of Rule 10.03 and required Fuchs to make multiple, hourly sales of alcohol 
enunciated first only in Lt. Clements' deposition. "Probably more than one drink. It's plural." 
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(See Donesley Affidavit; Exhibit R-8, Deposition of Robert Clements, pp. 35-36). This new 
first impression statement of policy exceeded statutory authority, was improper rulemaking, 
constituted an unreasonable exercise of police power, and violated the Idaho Constitution. 
In Bogner v. Dep 't of Revenue and Taxation. I 07 Idaho 854, 859 ( 1984 ), this Court 
explained that the purpose ofl.C. 12-117 "is two-fold: (1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or 
arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct 
mistakes agencies should never had made." In Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356-
357 (2005), the Court explained that "[t]he statute is not discretionary but provides that the court 
must award attorney fees where a state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law 
in a proceeding." The Court repeatedly has held that one of the purposes behind the statute is to 
remedy situations where persons have borne the financial costs resulting from groundless and 
arbitrary agency actions: 
The purpose of LC. 12-117 is two-fold: First, it serves "as a deterrent to 
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and [second, it provides] a remedy for 
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending 
against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes agencies never 
should have made. 
Reardon and Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115, 118 
(2004) (quoting Rincover v. State, Dept. of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 548-49 (1999) 
(quoting Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, I 07 Idaho 854, 859 (1984)). 
An agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it acts without any clear standards or 
determining principles. In Lane Ranch Partnership, v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87 (2007), 
the Court held that a government entity's "actions are considered arbitrary and capricious if 
made without a rational basis, or in disregard of the facts and circumstances, or without adequate 
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determining principles." Id. at 90. In Ater v. Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses, 144 Idaho 
281 (2007), this Court affirmed the district court ruling that the agency "acted arbitrary and 
capriciously because it disregarded the evidence as presented and failed to articulate clear 
standards" of an administrative violation. Id. at 284. This is consistent with this Court's 
standards for liquor licensing procedures. In Crazy Horse, Inc. v. Pearce, 98 Idaho 762 ( 1977), 
this Court explained that, the liquor licensing procedure "cannot be administered arbitrarily." Id. 
at 765. In O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 3 7 ( 1949) and Weller v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 386, 
392 (1963), this Court held that arbitrary liquor licensing statutes violated the licensee's 
fundamental rights of due process and were an unreasonable exercise of police power. 
ISP has acted arbitrarily and capriciously and without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
There was no articulation of standards by which Fuchs could have known how many sales were 
required to be compliant with Idaho law, other than what he was told previously and relied upon. 
New interpretations of Rule 10.03 surfaced throughout this proceeding. There was the original 
interpretation, relied upon by Fuchs, based on direction given by Lt. Clements' Administrative 
Assistant, that Rule 10.03 was not mandatory. 11 Then, there was the interpretation announced at 
Lt. Clements's deposition: multiple hourly sales, eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week. 
(Donesley Affidavit; Exhibit 8, Deposition of Robert Clements, pp. 35-36). Third, there was the 
interpretation by the Hearing Officer: "actual sales of liquor sometime while [the licensee] is in 
operation for eight hours a day/no fewer than six days a week." Preliminary Order at 15. 
Further, there was the interpretation announced by the Director: "sell at least one (1) glass of 
liquor sometime during every day that the establishment is open." Director's Final Order at 11. 
Fifth, there was the alternate interpretation announced by the Director, but then rejected: "sell at 
11 See Denise Rogers Affidavit at ,r 4. 
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least one (1) glass ofliquor sometime during every day that the establishment is open." Id. at 10. 
Amazingly, the Director did not refer to the prior administrators' long-standing interpretation 
and application of Rule 10.03 as one of the options. The Director admitted that his agency 
created "confusion" by not applying Rule 10.03 consistently. Each time ISP announced a new 
interpretation of Rule 10.03, it demonstrated its lack of "adequate determining principles." Lane 
Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 90 (2007). Each time ISP announced a 
new interpretation, it demonstrated that there were no "clear standards" by which to judge Fuchs' 
actions. Ater, 144 Idaho at 284. 
This "confusion" was a mistake that never should have been made. For fifteen years, ISP 
interpreted the rule one way. ISP did not require new licensees to make any number of sales to 
satisfy the "actual sales" requirement. 12 ISP/ ABC ignored this long-standing agency 
interpretation and enforcement of Rule 10.03 in filing against Fuchs its administrative revocation 
proceeding, requiring multiple hourly sales eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week. 
This Court has held that a basic rule of statutory construction is, first, to look at how an 
agency previously has applied a statute or rule, particularly if it has done so over a long period of 
time, to ascertain its meaning. The "application of the statute is an aid to construction, especially 
when the public relies on the application over a long period of time." Hamilton v. Reeder Flying 
Services, 135 Idaho 568, 571 (2001). ISP/ABC did the opposite. ISP/ABC disregarded the 
prior administrators' enforcement of Rule 10.03 and pursued revocation without having a clear 
standard. At his deposition, Lt. Clements stated the sales required was "[p Jrobably more than 
12 Three past ISP administrators refused to interpret Rule 10.03 to require "actual sales" based upon public policy 
grounds. "Such a requirement would have been unlawful, in violation of public policy. Rankin Affidavit at ,-r 4. 
"[S]uch a requirement would be nonsensical, since, as a matter of common sense, a licensee cannot control how 
many people come into a licensed premise and buy drinks over any period of time." Gould Affidavit at ,-r 5. "A new 
licensee would also satisfy the requirements ofl.C. 23-908 (4), ifhe or she secured a qualified premise and made 
liquor available at that premise, without making sales." Thompson Affidavit at ,-r 5. 
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one drink. It's plural." (Donesley Affidavit, Exhibit R-8, Deposition of Robert Clements, pp. 
35-36). The Director admitted, at least in part, that his agency failed to articulate a clear 
standard: 
On its face, IDAPA 11.05.01.010.03 requires "actual sales." Fuchs' misreading of 
the rule to ignore this express term is a clearly wrong interpretation. The only thing 
ambiguous about the rule was whether those actual required sales have to be 
hourly, daily or weekly. The Director has now clarified that only one ( 1) sale per 
day is necessary to comply with the rule. 
Director's Final Order at 16. 
The Director conceded that the rule was ambiguous: "The rule can reasonably be read 
one (1) of three (3) possible ways." Director's Final Order at 10. Nevertheless, he concluded, 
incredibly, that Fuchs had violated Rule 10.03. "Fuchs has failed to meet his obligation of 
making at least one (1) sale per day as required by the Director's interpretation of the rule." 
Final Order at 11. The Director failed to acknowledge that Fuchs complied with the Hearing 
Officer's interpretation of the rule, with the prior administrators' interpretation and with 
historical enforcement practices. The Director in his Order states that the only thing ambiguous 
about the Rule was the amount of sales required, "hourly, daily, or weekly." Id. However, the 
difference between what amount is required over what period is the difference between a 
revocation or not. Fuchs could only follow what he knew and had been told by ISP, that no 
number of "actual sales" over any specific period was required. ABC pursued revocation, even 
though Fuchs had more sales at Aubrey's, the licensed premise involved here, than he did at four 
other licensed premises in the past. (See, Fuchs Affidavit and Exhibits R-DF 1-5 attached 
thereto). 
The Director disregarded this evidence. He stated that Fuchs "was notified in a February 
25, 2008 letter from Nichole Harvey, ABC Management Assistant, that the license at issue in this 
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case (i.e. Aubrey's) would be subject to the actual sales requirement." Director's Final Order at 
14. However, this letter was the same as the one Denise Rogers sent to Mr. Fuchs in 2003. 
(Compare ISP Correspondence to Fuchs dated May 3, 2003 Exhibit R-DF-1 with ISP 
Correspondence to Fuchs, dated August 27, 2007, Exhibit R-DF-7). Consequently, the logic of 
the Director's ruling that Fuchs should have known that he could disregard that language in 
2003, but not in 2008, is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. 13 
In Ater, this Court explained that "judicial review is impractical, where this Court is left 
with no clear standard upon which to judge the alleged bad conduct and the Board's subsequent 
disciplinary decision." Id. at 285 (citing H & V Engr., Inc. v. Idaho St. Bd. of Prof Engrs. and 
Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 656 (1987) ("without clearly articulated standards as a backdrop 
against which the court can review discipline, the judicial function is reduced to serving as a 
rubberstamp for the Board's action. In Ater, the Board sanctioned an occupational licensee, 
disregarding the hearing officer's recommendations, disregarding the evidence, and without clear 
standards. The Board of Professional Counselors and Marriage and Family Therapists (the 
"Board") brought disciplinary proceedings against Ater for allegedly violating certain provisions 
of the American Counseling Association Code of Ethics, ("ACA"). The Board found violations 
and suspended Ater's license for one year. The District Court set aside the Board's order, 
concluding that the Board violated Ater's due process rights, because: 
(I) it did not use its specialized knowledge and experience to evaluate the 
evidence but, instead, substituted that knowledge for the evidence presented: (2) it 
failed to articulate the standard Ater was alleged to have violated or to make 
findings as to how Ater violated any particular standard and; (3) the record did not 
13 Before the Hearing Officer and Director, Fuchs had urged that ISP was barred from taking inconsistent positions 
under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. The Hearing Officer so ruled. The Director, however, stated that the elements 
of quasi-estoppel had not been met. Director's Final Order at 12-15. For the purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient 
to note that ISP has enforced two different standards on two separate occasions without any change in the law. This 
is evidence of arbitrary and capricious decision making without "adequate determining principles. Lane Ranch 
Partnership, 145 Idaho at 90. 
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disclose the knowledge and experience upon which the Board based its decision 
and therefore the record did not contain substantial evidence to support the 
Board's decision. 
Ater, 144 Idaho at 284 
The District Court in Ater also found that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously, as 
it disregarded the evidence presented and "failed to articulate clear standards" regarding what 
was meant by terms used in the ACA. The District Court awarded attorney fees to Ater under 
LC. 12-117, based on its finding that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Id. This Court 
affirmed: 
The Board's action against Ater was largely based upon its perception that Ater 
was serving his personal needs in following R.H. into the hall. However, it failed 
to define "personal needs" or explain how Ater was serving such needs. Rather, it 
chose to disregard a contrary finding by the hearing officer and made its own 
finding without explaining why. Thus, the Board's decision was without basis in 
fact or law. Ater was required to incur attorney fees in correcting a mistake the 
Board should not have made. Attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 12-117(1) are 
appropriate and we affirm the district court's award. 
Ater, 144 Idaho at 286. 
In our case, the Director rejected the recommendation of the Hearing Officer. 14 The 
Director disregarded evidence of Fuchs' sales at four licensed premises in Nampa. The Director 
ignored that Fuchs was given no notice of a change in policy. The Director gave no weight to the 
testimony of prior administrators. Instead, the Director substituted his own "expertise," as in 
Ater. He announced a new legal standard of what "actual sales" would be required, a standard 
only announced in his Final Order. Fuchs had not been given the opportunity to comply with the 
Director's new standard, before ISP filed the action to revoke his license. Applying this new, 
unpromulgated "rule," retroactively, to deprive Fuchs of costs and fees is irrational. 
14 In Ater, a hearing was held. In this case, the parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment. However, 
the Director's disregard of the evidence should result in the same "scrutiny" from this Court, because the agency 
head "disregarded a critical finding" of fact. Ater, I 44 Idaho at 285. 
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Further, ISP/ABC's pursuit of revocation, without first announcing the legal standard it 
sought to enforce, was based upon unlawful procedure. For ISP to depart from its longstanding 
practices, and begin requiring "actual sales," required that it first promulgate a new or amended 
rule. Asarco Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723 (2003). In Asarco, this Court explained that "an 
agency action characterized as a rule must be promulgated according to statutory directives for 
rulemaking, in order to have the force and effect oflaw. See LC. 67-5231 (declaring rules void 
unless adopted in substantial compliance with the requirements of the IAP A)" Id. at 723. There 
is no dispute that ISP did not promulgate a new or amended rule. Rather, the Director stated that 
ISP was not required to do so, citing the last paragraph of LC. 67-520 I (19), exempting an 
agency's written interpretations of a rule: 
The term [rule] includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule, 
but does not include: any written statements given by an agency which pertain to 
an interpretation of a rule or to the documentation of compliance with a rule." 
Idaho Code 67-5201 (19 (b) (iv). In this case, ABC's notification to Fuchs 
(including the interpretation adopted by the Director and state in this Final 
Decision) qualify as written statements from the agency to the licensee pertaining 
to how the agency is interpreting Rule I 0.03. As such, the interpretations are not 
rules and, therefore, are not subject to the formal rulemaking process. 
Director's Final Order at 15-16. 
The Director's reading of "written statements ... pertaining to a rule" is so broad that no 
agency action would ever be a rule, unless the agency declared it so. Such reading was rejected 
by this Court in Asarco, where DEQ made a similar, circular argument: 
It is undisputed that DEQ did not comply with formal rulemaking requirements. 
Rather than arguing it had substantially complied with the rulemaking 
requirements, DEQ argued it did not have to do so. Thus, the district court held 
that the TMDL is void for failure to comply with state administrative law. 
Asarco, 138 Idaho at 725. 
There is no dispute that, prior to this case, ISP did not require a specified number of 
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"actual sales." (See, Thompson, Rankin and Gould Affidavits). The Director says that everyone 
involved just got it wrong: "[p ]rior administrators, the Hearing Officer, and both parties 
misinterpreted what the rule requires." Director's Final Order at 17. The Director stated that he 
would be "reviewing this matter for possible rulemaking in the near future." Director's Final 
Order at 11, n. 4. Yet, ISP did not require a specified number of actual sales from Fuchs at his 
four Nampa bars. Further, the Director rejected Lt. Clements' multiple, hourly sales requirement 
as well. Director's Final Order at 10-11. The Director conceded that ISP/ABC had not 
interpreted the rule correctly when it filed this action. ISP/ ABC acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in pursuing this action. If a state agency fails to follow its own laws, it acts 
arbitrarily and capriciously, without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and is subject to costs and 
fees under I.C. 12-117. County Residents Against Pollution From Septic Sludge (CRAPSS) v. 
Bonner County, 138 Idaho 585 (2003) (county that failed to follow its ordinance acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously and without a reasonable basis in fact or law). 
Finally, ISP's "actual sales" requirement violates the IDAHO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III,§ 
24, which provides that 
The first concern of all good government is the virtue and sobriety of the people, 
and the purity of the home. The legislature should further all wise and well 
directed efforts for the promotion of temperance and morality. 
Id. 
ISP's new requirement, pursued by ISP in the revocation case, first enunciated in Lt. Clements' 
deposition. (Donesley Affidavit; Exhibit R-8, Deposition of Robert Clements, pp. 35-36, now 
abandoned even by the Director, Director's Final Order at 11), of multiple, hourly sales did not 
promote "temperance and morality," but alcohol consumption. Previous ISP administrators 
explained in affidavits that this state constitutional provision was important in explaining why 
each had not required a specified amount of actual sales of liquor when they oversaw ABC. 
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(Thompson Affidavit at ,r 6, Rankin Affidavit atif 4 ). A state agency that violates terms of the 
state constitution has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Reardon and.Magic Valley 
Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Burley, 140 Idaho 115 (2004) (county did not act with reasonable 
basis in fact or law when it enacted ordinance because ordinance violated terms of state 
constitution and local land use planning act. LC. 12-117). 
ISP/ABC pursued license revocation without having first promulgated a legal standard of 
how many "actual sales" was required to comply with Rule 10.03. In this case, this failure 
violated Fuchs' fundamental rights of due process, exceeded ISP' s statutory authority and was 
based upon unlawful procedure. ISP requiring a specified number of "actual sales" is contrary to 
the state constitutional requirement that the government promote "temperance and morality." 
And, ISP acted without "adequate determining principles." Accordingly, the Director erred, not 
only by failing to rule that Fuchs was the "prevailing party," but also by failing to rule that his 
agency had acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The District Court erred in not 
addressing the issue on judicial review. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred when it held that Fuchs failed to show that his "substantial right" 
to attorney fees, as prevailing party, was prejudiced when ISP/ ABC acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law, arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of Fuchs' due process, based upon 
unlawful procedure, and in a manner contrary to the Idaho Constitution. This Court should 
exercise free review of this request for costs and fees and decide the issue, even though the 
District Court did not reach whether ISP/ ABC acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
This Court should remand this matter to the Director for a determination of the costs and attorney 
fees that should be awarded pursuant to J.C. 12-117. Further, Fuchs requests costs on appeal 
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before this Court to Fuchs based upon I.A.R. 41. 
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